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ABSTRACT 
TIte Spanish Treasury is the only one in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory 
and unuonn price auctions to sell bonds. In the Spanish auction, winning bidders pay their bid 
price if it is lower than tbe weighted average price of witming bids, while all other winning 
bidders pay the weighted average price of winning bids. We adapt Gordy's (96) medel of the 
discriminatory auction to the Spanish auction. The model is a discrete model of multiple bids in 
a multiple-unit common value auction. We use numerical simulations to find equilibria for the 
Spanish, the unifonn and the discriminatory auction. OUT results show that bidders in the 
Spanish and discriminatory auctions use bid spread to cover themselves against uncertainty, and 
that expected seller's revenue is larger on average in the fonner. 
RESUMEN 
El Tesoro español es el único en el mundo que usa un sistema híbrido de subastas 
discriminatoria y unifonne para subastar Letras del Tesoro. En la subasta Española, las pujas 
ganadoras pagan su precio si están por debajo del precio medio ponderado de las pujas 
ganadoras (W AP) Y el W AP en otro caso. Adaptamos un modelo de Gordy(96) de subastas 
discriminatorias al caso español. El modelo es de múltiples pujas, discretas, con múltiples 
unidades y valoración común. Usamos simulaciones para encontrar equilibrios en la subasta 
Española, discriminatoria y unifonne. Nuestros resultados muestran que los pujadores en las 
subastas Española y discriminatoria usan bid spread para cubrise contra la incertidumbre, y que 
los ingresos esperados del vendedor son, en media, mayores en la primera. 
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Que of the most important auction markets in the world ís the market foc government debt. 
Treasuries apply mainly two auction formats: discriminatory and uniform priee auctions. In a 
discriminatory auction, used by the majority of the Treasuries around the world, winning 
bidders pay their bid price. A few Treasuries use uniform price auctions, where all winning 
bidders pay the same price foc each unít, the mínimum accepted priee. But the Spanish 
Treasury is the oruy Qlle that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and unifurm price 
auctions: winning bidders pay their bid priee if it i8 lower than the weighted average price of 
winning bids, while aH other winning bidders pay the weighted average of winning bids. With 
the Spanish format, the price that sorne bidders have to pay for certain units depends on the 
bids of all other winning bidders, inc1uding bis own bids. This fact increases the pIayers' 
strategic considerations with respect to discriminatory and uniform auctions, even in the more 
simple models. 
The general director of tbe Spanish Treasury, Jaime Camana, mentioned that "the adoption 
of the euro will establish a more efficient market, in which the Spanish debt will have to 
compete with other countries' debt on ¡nterest rates, credit quality and calendar" (El País, 
April 14, 1998). He did not mentíon that it has to compete with a different auction 
mechanism. But his statement calls attention to the fact that competition has increased afier 
January 1999, and it is important to establish the characteristics of the Spanish auction 
mechanism, both from the point ofview ofthe seller and the buyers. 
This paper studies the Spanish Treasury auctions, and compares them with the discriminatory 
auctions, the fOImat that is used by most Treasuries around the world. We consider two 
aspects of the Spanish auction. First, in Treasury auctions bidders are allowed to submit 
multiple bids, and they do. In Spain, the average number ofbids per competitive bidder is 2.7, 
and both in the United States and Portugal, the median number of bids per bidder is three1. 
Gordy (96) conjectures that in discriminatory auctions, multiple bids can be used to hedge 
against winner's curse, as well as to express downward sloping demand due to risk aversion. 
We study the use of multiple bids in the Spanish auction, and whether Gordy's conjecture 
also holds for the Spanish auction. Secand, a principal aim of auction theory is the ranking of 
different types of auctions with respect to the expected seller's revenue. We consider the 
ranking of the Spanish and the discriminatory auctions in terms of revenue. 
We adapt Gordy's model for the discriminatory auction to the Spanish auction. The mode! is 
a discrete model, that allows explicitIy for the use of multiple bids in a multiple-unit auction. 
It models Treasury auctions as common value auctions with asyrnmetric information. Using 
numerical simulations, we find all (if any) Bayesian Nash syrnmetric equilibria for the 
Spanish, the discriminatory and the uniform auction, for a wide range of parameter 
combinations. 
Our main findings can be summarÍzed as follows. First, Gordy' s conjecture holds for the 
Spanish auction: multiple bidding in the Spanish auctions is used to hedge against the 
winner's curse, as well as to express downward sloping demand due to risk aversioo. We fmd 
that tbis hedging against the winner' s curse is stronger in the Spanish than in the 
discriminatory auction. There are two contributing factors. On the one hand, bidders can 
1 See Mazón and Nufiez (99) regarding Spain, and Gordy (96) regarding the U.S. and Portugal. 
¡ncrease their bid on the first unit at a lower expected cost for the Spanish auction than for the 
discriminatory auction: if they have overvalued the good and they win, they on1y pay the 
weighted average price instead oftheir bid, as they do in the discriminatory case. On the other 
hand, they have an incentive to lower their bid for the second unit, since for the Spanish 
auction the low bid detennines the price the bidder has to pay on the frrst unit if he wins two 
units: the lower bis bid on the second unit is, the lower is the price that the bidder has to pay 
for the first unit. Second, it is not possible to offer a complete ranking ofthe Spanish and the 
discriminatory auctions with respect to expected seller's revenue. First of aH, the ranking 
vades with the values of the parameters. And for sorne parameter values there are multiple 
equilibria, and the ranking depends upon which of the equilibria is examined. Nevertheless, 
on average across the multiple equilibria, the Spanish auction gives higher ~xpected. seller's 
revenue than the discriminatory auction. Note that, as we have argued, bldders bId more 
aggressively for the rlIst unit in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction, which tends to 
increase expected seller's revenue; but if they win with the highest bid, they only pay the 
weighted average price, lower than their bid that they pay on the discriminatory auction. OUT 
results suggest that the first effect is higher than the second. 
2. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
An abundant literature exits on uniform and discriminatory auctions, and general results are 
established for the auctioning of a single, indivisible item, results that can be extended to 
settings with multiple units, if each bidder has ataste for only ane ¡temo But as Asube1 and 
Cramton (98) mention, "io environments with multiple units and bidders who each may 
desire multiple units, general results about even the most common auctioo forms remain 
elusive". The reason is that the problem is very complicated. First of aH, bidders have a very 
large strategy space. Second, there is a strategic component in bidding: in a uniform auction, 
bids on later units might detennioe the price the bidder pays for earlier umts. And third, 
Treasury auctions are assumed to be common-value auctions, where there is a true value of 
each unit, unknown to the bidders at the time of the auction, and bidders receive prívate 
signals conceming the value of the asset. If bidders receive different signals, that ¡s, if the 
model allows asymmetric information, equilibrium bids must address not only the strategic 
component ofbidding, but the inference problem due to asymmetric information. 
Most authors that study multiple-unit auctions where bidders demand more than one unit, 
follow the "share auctions" approach, proposed by Wilson (79), where the good is assumed 
to be perfectly divisible and a bid is a smooth demand schedule. Wang and Zender (98) 
characterized the equilibria for both the discriminatory and the uniform auction, when bidders 
possess private information, and conclude that the equilibrium bidding strategies take explicit 
account of the winoer' s curse. If a11 the bidders have the same information, they obtain an 
analytical solution and fully characterized the set of equilibria under risk neutrality and risk 
aversion utility, assuÍning a specific functional form for noncompetitive demando They obtain 
a continuum of equilibria for the uoiform auction, and only one equilibrium for the 
discriminatory auction if a reserve price of zero is imposed. Given the multiplicity of 
equilibria for the uniform auction, they conclude that it is not possible to rank: both auction 
formats in tenns of expected sellers' revenue. Asubel and Cramton (98) also fol1ow the "share 
auction" approach, and provide several examples to demoostrate that auctÍons results are 
inefficient, and that the ranking of uoiform and discriminatory auctions is ambiguous: they 
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provide examples witb reasonable specificatioos of demand where the uniform auction 
dominates the discriminatory auction on expected seller revenues, and equally reasonable 
specifications where the reverse is true. 
A different approach is taken by Gordy (96), which offers a discrete counterpart of Wilson' s 
(79) continuous "share auction" model. He uses numerical simulations to find equilibria for 
the discriminatory auction, when two units of an indivisible good are auctioned to N bidders. 
He finds evidence that supports the conjecture that multiple-bidding can be used to hedge 
wioner's curse, wben bidders are risk averse. 
Compared to the overwhelming amount of work about uniform and discriminatory auctions, 
very Hule has been said about the Spanish auction fonnat. To our knowledge, the properties 
orthe Spanish auction mechanism have beeo studied only by Salinas (90), Mazón and Nuñez 
(99), and Álvarez, Cerdá and Mazón (99). Salinas (90) presents a madel where demand is 
restricted to one unit per bidder, and values are private. He uses the results of Maskin and 
Riley (89) to argue that the Spanish mechanism generates the same expected revenue as 
uniform and discriminatory auctions. Mazón and Nuñez (99) presents a stylized game 
theoretical model that captures the two distinct features of the Spanish auction: the hybrid 
system of uniform and discrimioatory auctions used; and the uncertaioty about the amaunt to 
be issued. They show that, under the assumptions of the model, the auction farmat used in 
Spain is equivalent in tenns of revenue to the seller to the discriminatory format, and that 
both formats maximize the seller's revenue. And they present an empirical analysis, using 
data of Spanish bond auctions between 1993 and 1997. They find evidence of the good 
functiooing of the market, and the relatively low price differentials paid by accepted bids, 
which is consistent with the results of the model. But the made! assumes that demand 
functions are common knowledge, and a bid is a price-quantity pair; therefore, the madel 
allows multiple-unít demands, but at the same price. Álvarez et al. (99) foltow the "share 
auction" approach and characterize the set of linear equilibria for the Spanish auction. 
3. MULTIPLE BIDS: THE DISCRIMINATORY AND THE SPANISH CASE 
3.1 The model 
We follow Gordy (96) and adapt his model for the discriminatory auction to the uniform and 
to the Spanish auctions. N bidders compete for two indivisible and identical units of a goad. 
Each bidder submits two sealed bids, specifying a price, but not a particular uoí1. The twa 
units are awarded to the twa highest bids, and if there is a tie, there is randomization among 
the tie bids2. Payments depend on the auction type. In the discriminatory auction, winning 
bids pay the bid price. In the uniform auction, alt winning bids pay the sarue price for each 
unit, the minimum accepted bid. In the Spanish auction, winning bids pay the bid price if it is 
lower than the weighted average of winning bids 0N AP), and pay the W AP if the bid price is 
higher than the W AP. 
2 Pro rata distribution is used in real auctions. But we follow Gordy, Utat mentions Utat "the 10S5 in realism is 
more tlmn offset by a 10ss in computational efficiency", and that "limited exploration ofthe model suggest very 
similar results" with pro rata distnbution rather tlmn randomization among tie bids. 
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As an example, consider two bidders, A and B, bidding (4,1) and (3,2) respectively. That is, 
bidder A bids 4 for one unit and 1 for the other. Winning bids are 4 and 3, and hence each 
bidder gets one unit in the three auction formats. In the discriminatory auction, A pays 4 and 
B pays 3; in the uniform auction, botb bidders pay 3; and in the Spanish auction A pays 
O.5(4+3)~3.5, the WAP, and B pays 3. 
The true unit value of the good for sale, Y, is unknown to the bidders at the time of the 
auction. The prior distribution ofy is F(y), and it is public information. We assurne F(v) to be 
beta (a)..l., a.(1-)..I.»; this distribution has mean )..1. and variance decreasing in a. Hence, the 
larger a is, the more accurate is public inforrnation. Furthermore, each bidder draws a signal 
frorn the finite set X;;::;{O,l, ... ,K}, with K>O. The probability distributÍon of the signal 
conditional on v is assumed to be binomial (K,V)3. Signals are independent across bidders and 
are private inforrnation: each bidder only observes his own signal. Bidders combine public 
information (the prior 00 v) aod private inforrnation (the signal received) using Bayes rule. 
The posterior distribution of v, F(v/x), is beta (x+a)l, K~X+a(l~)..I.», where x is the signal that 
the bidder has received (xeX), see DeGroot (70). The posterior mstribution has eonditional 
expeeted value E(v/x)={x+a.)..I.)/(K+a), and its variance is decreasing inK and a. 
One possible interpretation of E(v/x) is the following. It can be rewritten as: 
E(v/x)"'8(x/K)+(1~8»)..I., where 8=(l+aJK)-I. Furthennore x/K is the maximum likelihood 
estimator [oc v based on1y on prívate inforrnation. Therefore, B(v/x) is a strictly convex 
combination of )..1. (publie infonnation) and x/K (private information), where the former 
receives more weight as a (aceuracy of publie inforrnation) inereases or K (aecuraey of 
private information) decreases. 
Priees are restrieted to a finite set Aa{O, 1/1."2/1.,, ... !}, A being sorne positive integer. The 
priees are restricted to the interval (0,1) beeause the support of F(v/x) is the interval (0,1). We 
allow only for a finite number of priees for two reasons. First, in practice, Treasury auctions 
in Spain (and in most collntries) have restrietions on the set ofbids permitted. Seeond, ifthe 
set of perrnitted bids is dense, pure strategy eqllilibria does not exist, as in Gordy (96). 
Bidders are assumed to be risk averse, and to have a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
utility funetion, U(z)=-exp(-pz), where p, strictly positive, is the eoefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, common to all bidders. 
A strategy for bidder i is a function S:X 4AxA. That ¡s, a strategy is a funetion that defines a 
pair of bids, (SI(X),S,(x)), for every possible signal x. Let D={SI, ... ,S"), and l: .• sl:-{s'}. 
Without 10ss of generality, we assume S¡(X)2S2(X) and we refer to s¡(x) (S2(X» as the high 
(low) bid for signal x. 
In the Spanish auctio~, given a signa! x, and a strategy profile for all bidders but bidder i, L_I, 
bidder i chooses the pair of bids (SI,S2) to maximize his expected utility. There are four 
possible outcornes. He can win both umts, and given the auetion rules, he will pay the average 
priee, (SI+S2 )/2, [or the first unit, and his lower bid, S2, for the seeond unit; sinee the v 1S the 
true value ofthe good, rus profit if he wins two units is 2v- (SI+S2 )/2-82. H e can win one unít 
3 Witll a binomial distribution, the probability of a high signal increases with v, and the probability of a low 
signa! decreases wiili v. 
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with a bid lower or equal to the other winning bid, so that he pays his high bid, SI, and bis 
profit is v~ SI. He ean win one unit with a bid higher than the other winning bid, so that he 
pays the average price of his high bid and the other winning bid, denoted by s, and his profit 
is Y-(SI+S )/2. And he can win zero units. Define h2(.) as the probability ofwinning exaetly 
two units, ht(') as the probability ofwinning one unit and that the other unit is not awarded at 
a lower price, hl'(') as the probability ofwinning one unit and that the otber unit is awarded at 
a lower price s, and hoO as the probability of winning zero units. These probabilities depend 
on the i~th bidder bids, (SI,82), rivals' strategies, L_I, and the true value of the good4, v. The 
expeeted utility ofbidding (S¡,S2) is given by the following expression: 
ECU s (SI,82)) = f~(U(2v-Si: S2 -S2) h2( SI,S2,:E_¡, v) + 
+ U(v- SI) hd 81,S2,:E_¡, v) + _L U(v- SI +s ) hd 81,S2,$,:E.;, v)+ 
seA 2 
(1) 
+U(O) hn( SI ,S2,L_¡,V))dF(vlx) 
Analogously, in the diserirninatory auction, it is: 
E(U d (SI,S2))= J~(U(2V-WS2)hd SI,S2,L_i'V) + (2) 
+ U(v-SI) hl'( SI ,S2,2:.;, v)+U(O) hd SI ,S2,L_;, v)dF(vlx) 
where h2(.) and ho(.) are defined as aboye, and hl'{) is the probability of winning one unit. 
Contrarily to the Spanish ease, the payment for one unit in the diseriminatory ease does not 
depend on whether tbe otber unit is awarded at a lower price or not, hence hl,{)=ht{.)+h l (.). 
In the unifonn auction, it is: 
E(UU (81,S2)) = I~(U(2v-2s2)h2 (sI ,S2,¿.¡' v) + 
+ U(v-81)h¡{ SI,$2,L_¡,v) + _L U(v-s)hdsl,S2,S,L_¡,V)+ 
~A 
+U(O) hn( SI,82,L_¡,v))dF(vlx) 
whereh,O, h1{) and hd.) and haO are defined as above. 
(3) 
The model we just presented is a simultaneous game of ineomplete information, and the 
equilibrium eoneept we use is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We only eonsider pure strategy 
equilibrium. An equilibrium is a set of N strategies, L={ St, .. . ,s"'}, sueh that for all bidders and 
eaeh signal x, bidder i maxÍrnizes his expected utility with bids (St(x), S2(X», given that all 
other bidders' strategies are ¿_,-aLw{S}. We restrict our analysis to syrnrnetric equilibria, that 
is, equilibria of the form La{S, ... ,S}. Note tbat this does not imply that alI bidders bid the 
same prices in equilibrium, but tbat all bidders that receive the same signal bid the same . 
priees. 
The rnodel 1S intractable analytiealIy, even in the simplest cases. Henee we solve the model 
numerically for different parameter values. The details on the numerical implementation are 
left to the Appendix. 
4To see the dependence on v, note that rivals' bids depend on :E_i and on rivals' signals, wruch in turn 
dependon v. 
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3.3 Equilibria oftbe model 
The vector ofparameters ofthe model is (N,Il,a.,P,A.,K). We present results for a selection of 
parameter eombinations that we eonsider reasonable, given the eomputational limitations we 
have. With respeet to the number ofbidders, N, since there are only two indivisible units for 
sale, to consider N>4 means that, in any symmetrie equilibrium, the probability that a single 
bidder gets at least one unít is very small. For this reason, we present results with N in 
{2,3,4}. We have set the a priori expeeted value ofv, !l, equal to 0.75. Note that ¡.t must lie in 
(0,1), and that if Il were too small, the a posteriori expeeted value of v would be too small for 
bidders to bid strictly positive bids for every possible signal. For the parameter of aeeuraey of 
prior information, a., we have selected values in {2,4,6, ... ,20}. For a=2, that ¡s, the maximum 
uncertainty case within the previous set, the standard deviation of the prior distribution on v is 
0.25 (recal! that this distribution Is defined on (0,1) and that its average, /l, is 0.75). For a=20, 
the standard deviation is approximately 0.1. For the parameter of risk aversion, p, we have 
selected values in {l,S,IO}. We consider p=l close to the risk neutral case, and consider 
higher values of p to study the effeet of increasing risk aversion. Finally, the required 
eomputation time makes it unfeasible to explore a number of possible priees, ).,+1, higher 
than 12, or a number of private signals, K+l, higher than 5. Thus, we have selected the 
eombinations ('A,K) in {(S,2),(5,4),(9,2)}. Henee, for every auction format, we have explored 
270 combinations ofparameters5. 
Figure 1 shows an example of an equilibrium bidding strategy for the Spanish auction, when 
there are 2 players (N=2), the accuracy ofprivate information is low (a.=4), risk aversion is 
low (p=l), there are 6 possible priees (/...=5), and there are five possible signals (K=4). 
Figure 1: An equilibrium for the Spanish auctíon 
Given ).,=5, the possible priees are A={0,1I5,2/S,3/5,4/5,1}, which are represented in the 
vertical axis; and giv~n K=4, the possible signals are X={O,l,2,3,4}, which are represented in 
the horizontal axis. We plot the bids, Sl(X) and S2(X), circles and squares respectively, for 
every signal x in X 
5 Gordy (96) uses similar parameter values for the model except for K, for which he uses values up to 7. 
The algoritlun be uses requires a shorter computation time than ours, wrnch in tum allows him to take larger 
values for K. However, given a vector of panuneter values, be only finds an arbitrary subset of the equilibria 
while we find alI. For a comparison ofboth algoritluns, see fue Appendix. 
6 
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We eharacterize equilibria using two summary statisties. Let the bid spread, denoted by A(S), 
be the expected differenee between a bidder's high aud low bid, Í.e.: 
.6.(S) = É(s¡ (X)-S2(X»)Pr(x). Since we have taken Sl(X)2s2(X), A(S) is positive. In addition, sinee 
=, 
S1(X) and S2(X) He in (0,1), ¡ts differenee also does. Henee, A(S) is a strictly eonvex 
eombination ofvalues in (0,1), and therefore A(S) is also in (0,1) for every S. For the example 
given in Figure 1, A(S)=0.07. 
Let R(S) be the expected seller's revenue ir all bidders play S, i.e., ReS) = ¿rey,s)Pr(y) where 
, 
rÚ',S) is the seller' s revenue if bidders play S aud the N~dimensional vector of private signals 
is y. The summation on the ¡atter expression is over all possible vectors of signals. Sinee 
every bid lies in (0,1) and two units are awarded, R(S) Hes in (0,2) for every S, independentIy 
ofthe auction format6 . Forthe example given in Figure 1, R(S)=1.08. 
Next, we summarize the main findings. 
Existence of equilibria. We check if every possible pure strategy is part of a symrnetric 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and find that for the three auetion formats, there ís not a 
symmetrie equilibrium for sorne sets of parameter values. The existence of equilibrium varies 
with the auetion format: the model has at least an equilibrium in 51% of the cases for the 
Spanish auction, in 96% for the discriminatory auction, and on1y in 10% for the uniform 
auction. The non existence of equilibria is probably due to the diserete nature of the model, 
and we eoncentrate in eomparing equilibria [or sets ofparameters fur whieh we have at least 
an equílibrium for the Spanish and the diseriminato:ry auetion. In what follows, we do not 
report results on the uniform auction, given that it on1y exists for a few parameter 
eombinations. 
Why these differences on existence among auetion types? We think that it is due to strategie 
considerations. In both the uniform and the Spanish auetion, given that all other bidders are 
playing the same strategy, S, if bidder i, instead of responding with S, ¡ncreases his high bid 
for a given signal, he increases the probability ofwinning at a low cost both for the uniform 
(the cut-offpriee is either his bid or does not change) and the Spanish auction (he pays his bid 
or the WAP, that may change slightly), and therefore increases his expeeted utility. This is 
not the case for the discriminatory auetion. The profitability of such a deviation inereases 
with the number of players, N, sinee the probability of winning at least one unit by playing 
the same strategy as aH other players, in general, decreases with N. Thus, for a1l auction types, 
the number of parameter combinations for whieh there exist equilibria decreases with N. In 
particular, in the uniform format, there exist equilibria only for N=2. 
Uniqueness of equilibria. When equilibrium exist, we ofien find more than one for both the 
Spanish and the discriminatory auetions. We think that multiplicity of equilibria ís also due to 
the discrete nature of the model. The equilibrium is unique in 68% of the cases for the 
Spanish auction, and in 41 % for the diseriminatory auction. Multiple equilibria for the same 
parameter combination differ from one another in terms of bid spread and seller's expected 
6The extreme case is a strategy Sin whichs¡(x}=s2(x)=1 for allx, this leads to R(S)=2 inany auction. In 
general, as rnentioned, given a strategy s, R(S) depends on the auction format srnce r(y,S) does. 
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revenue. 
As N and A. increase, we observe other kinds of multiplicity of equilibria. For example, for 
N=4, /...=9, K=2, a.=16 and p=lO, there are 45 equilibria both for the Spanish and the 
discriminatory auetion, but there are onIy three different values for expected seller' s revenue 
across the 45 equilibria. Equilibria with identicaI expeeted seller's revenue are eharacterized 
by a high bid that is identicaI across equilibria, and they differ only on the low bids, whieh are 
such that for any bidder, the probability ofwinning two units is zero (any low bid across al! 
signals is lower than any high bid); as a consequenee all eombinations of low bids tbat are 
lower tban any high bid are part of an equilibrium. Note that the probability of winning two 
bids, and benee the relevance of the low bid, decreases with N, and thus we observe more 
multiple equilibria of this kind for large N. Also, the number of possible combinations of 
¡rrelevant low bids increases with A., and therefore multiple equilibria also ¡ncrease with A.. 
Bid Spread. Diagrams 1 to 3 present bid spread for the Spanish and discriminatory auetion 
for the 270 eombinations of parameters considered. Diagram 1 shows bid spread for /"=5 and 
K=2; eaeh orthe 9 fígures on Diagram 1 represents a eombination of p and N, and shows bid 
spread as a funetion of a.. Diagrams 2 and 3 show the same information for /,,=5 and K=4, and 
for A.=9 and K=2, respectively. Bid spread for the Spanish auction is represented by a square, 
and for the discriminatory auction by a circle. When there are multiple equilibria, we present 
the average value. Missing dats represent non-existence of equilibria for the corresponding 
auction format and eombination of parameters. 
Gordy (96) conjeetures that multiple bids can be used to hedge against winner's curse, as 
well as to express downward sloping demand due to risk aversion, and fínds that resutts for 
the discriminatory auction are, in general, consistent with the conjecture. He measures the use 
of muItiple bids by bid spread. Our resutts show that the conjecture is also valid for the 
Spanish auetion: bidders use bid spread to caver themselves against uncertainty. By spreading 
bids over a range of prices, bidders hedge against the risk of winning due to a misestimation 
ofthe value ofthe security. When they have overestimated the value ofthe good auctioned, 
they win at a lower average price than expected; when they have underestimated the value, 
they win at a higher average price than expected. To support this idea, note that on the 
diagrarns, both for the discrirninatory and the Spanish auction, there are many equilibria 
where bid spread is equal to O, Le., bidders submit the same bid for both units, when the 
parameter of risk aversion is low (p = 1), and the number of equilibria with zero bid spread 
~eereases as p increases. Also zero bid spread oecurs more ofien for larger values of a., that 
lS, as public information becomes more accurate. Therefore, both in the discriminatory and 
t~e Spanish auction, as bidders are more risk averse and there is less public information, 
btdders spread theÍf bids to caver thernselves against uncertainty. 
The diagrarns also sbow tbat, on average, bid spread is higher or equal for the Spanish auction 
than. for the discriminatory auction. There are two eontributing factors. First, for the Spanish 
auchon, bidders can increase the bid on the fírst unit at a lower cost than for the 
diseriminatory auction: if they have overvalued the good and they win, they only pay the 
W AP instead of their bid as in the discriminatory case. Second, for the Spanish auction the 
low bid determines the priee the bidder has to pay on the first unit ifhe wins two units7: the 
7 As mentioned, the probability of tlris event decreases with N and 'A.. 
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lower bis bid on the second unit is, the lower is the W AP that the bidder has to pay on the 
fírst unit. Note that this strategic effect is not present in the discriminatory case, where the bid 
on the second unit has no effect on tbe price tbe bidder pays on the fírst unít. Since the high 
bid tends to be higber, and the lower bid lower in the Spanisb tban in the discriminatory case, 
bid spread ls higher in the Spanísh than in the discriminatory auction. 
In 71% of the cases when there is equilibria for both the discriminatory and tbe Spanish 
auction, at least one of tbe equilibria is identical (same bids for each signal) for both 
auctions. In general, it occurs for higher values of a, that ¡s, as publie information beco mes 
more accurate. We interpret this resuIt as an indication that the Spanish auction works 
differently to the discriminatory auction when there is more uncertainty (small a), and 
therefore, more potential for the winner' s curse. 
Seller's Revenue. Table 1 illustrates how average expeeted seller's revenue changes with the 
different parameters. For eaeh ofthe values considered for K, A, p, N and a, the table shows 
average (across equilibria) expected seller's revenue both for the Spanisb (S) and the 
discriminatory (D) aumion fonnats. For example, for K=2 the average expeeted seller's 
revenue is 1.159 for the Spanish auction and 1.119 for the diseriminatory auction. The 
averages are computed for tbe parameter combinations for which at least one equilibrium for 
both the Spanish and the discriminatory auctions exists. There are 136 sueh eombinations. 
Table 1: Average expected seller's revenue 
K N 
Par. Value 2 4 5 9 1 5 10 2 3 4 
S 1.159 1.136 1.128 1.213 1.229 1.175 1.100 1.071 1.207 1.253 
D 1.1191.1211.0901.1871.1581.1571.0691.0341.177 1.217 
a 
Par. Value 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
S 0.956 1.005 1.090 1.1201.168 1.180 1.199 1.211 1.217 1.230 
D 0.854 0.974 1.029 1.101 1.124 1.144 1.167 1.183 1.206 1.207 
The expected seller' s revenue inereases for both auction formats as the number of possíble 
prices, A, the number of players, N, and the accuracy of public information, a., ¡nereases; and 
as the parameter of risk aversion, p, deereases. The results on N and a. conform with the 
results for the Milgrom and Weber (82) single-unit model; also, as risk aversion decreases, 
bids are more aggressive and expected seller's revenue increases. The effect of increasing tbe 
number of possible signals, K, is ambiguous. Note that increasing the number of possible 
signals, on the one hand decreases ¡-th bidder' s uncertainty on the true value of the good, but 
on the other hand increases bis uncertainty on the other bidders' signals. 
How do both auction fonnats compare in tenns of expected seller's revenue? For all the 
parameters considered in Table 1, average expected seller's revenue is higher for the Spanish 
than for the discriminatory auction. However, there are many parameter combinations for 
whieh the ranking of equilibria is ambiguous, because there are multiple equilibria for one or 
both auction fonnats. For example, we can fínd parameter combinations for wbich there are 
two equilibria in the discriminatory case, with expected seller's revenue Rtd and R/ 
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respectively, and one in the Spanish case, with RS, and such that RI d< RS <R/; note that it can 
also be the case that R3>O.5(R/ +R/). Considering the expected seller's revenue for each 
parameter combination instead of averages, the Spanish format dominates the discriminatory 
one in 39% of the cases, out of the 136 parameter combinations where at least one 
equilibrium exist for both auction formats&. Note also that as mentioned earlier, in 71 % ofthe 
cases when there is equílibria for both auction formats, at least one equilibria is identical for 
both auctions; in this case, expected seller' s revenue is higher for the discriminatory auction, 
since the winner with the highest bid pays bis bid, while in the Spanish one he only pays the 
WAP; but the difference in expected seller's revenue is small. What can we condude then 
from the evidence? First, that the ranking of both auction formats on tenns of expected 
seller's revenue is impossible, because there are many cases of multiple equilibria such that 
sorne equilibria for one auction format has a higher expected seller's revenue than sorne 
equilibria for tbe other, but the reverse holds for other equilibria. Second, that on average the 
Spanish auction gives higher expected seIler's revenue: there are equilibria for the 
discriminatory auction that give 10w expected seller' s revenue. Note that there are two 
different faets that could explain the different expected seller' s revenue in the Spanish and the 
diserimioatory auction: on the one hand, bidders in the Spanish auetion bid more aggressively 
00 the first unit, since they only pay the W AP instead of their bid if they win with the highest 
bid, which tends to increase expected seller' s revenue; on the other hand they only pay the 
W AP, whieh tends to decrease expected seller' s revenue. The results are consistent with the 
first fact dominating the second, on average. 
For what parameter combinations does the Spanish auction domínate in terms of expected 
seller's revenue the diseriminatory auction? Table 2 presents the percentage of parameter 
combinations for which the Spanish auction dominates the discriminatory. For example, in 
42% ofthe parameter combinations with K=2 where there are equilibria for the Spanish and 
discriminatory auetions, the fonner dominates9. 
T bl 2 D a e : ornmance in terms of expected seller's revenue for tbe Spanish auction 
K A o N 
Par. Value 2 4 5 9 I 5 10 2 3 4 
0.42 0.29 0.41 0.34 0.82 0.33 0.24 0.31 0.47 0.44 
"-
Par. Value 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
0.63 0.25 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.41 0.29 0.44 0.69 
The table shows that, in general, the Spanish auction dominates the discriminatory auetion 
when risk aversion is low (for p=l, the Spanish auction dominates the discriminatory one in 
82% ofthe cases). The intuition is simple. Bidders bid more aggressively in the Spanish case 
for the first .unit .than in ~he dis~rimin~tory auc:ion since they only pay the W AP if they 
happen to WIfl w1th the hlgher bid. Thls effect IS specialIy strong if bidders have low risk 
aversion (small p). Despite the faet that bidders onIy pay the WAP for the higher bid, this 
more aggressive bidding gives higher expected revenue to the seller. The change in 
dominance with the other parameters is not clear. 
8 Dominates means tbat tbe worst Spanish equilibrium (in terms of cxpected seller's revenue) is not worse than 
tite best discriminatory one. 
9 RecaIl that it does flOl imply tIlat tbe ¡atter dominates in tbe remaining 58%. 
10 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper develops a model of multiple bids in a common value auction for the Spanish 
auction format, following Gordy (96), that develops the model for the discriminatory auetion 
format. The Spanish auction is a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform priee auctions: 
winning bidders pay their bid price if it is lower than the weighted average priee of winning 
bids, while all other winning bidders pay the weighted average ofwinning bids. There are two 
units for saje, and bidders bid for both units. Both signals and bids are restricted to a finite set, 
which makes the problem salvable by simulations. We find equilibria for the Spanish, the 
uniform and the discriminatory auction, and compare them. Of course, we salve a special 
case, assuming functional forms for utility and distributions. But given the Hule that is known 
about the Spanish auction, we think that our results offer interesting insights about how it 
works. 
Our main findings are the following. First, both in the Spanish and in the discriminatory 
auctions bidders use bid spread to cover themselves against uncertainty. Second, bid spread is 
higher io the Spanish auctioo for two reasons: on the one hand, since the cost of overbidding 
is lower due to the fact that a winning bidder with the highest bid only pays the weighted 
average priee, while he pays his bid in a discriminatory auction, bidders bid more 
aggressively on their first unit; on the other hand, sioce the bid 00 the second unit could 
chaoge the price paid on the first unit in the Spanish auetion, bidders have an incentive to 
lower their seeond bid that is not present in the discriminatory auetion. Third, expected 
seller's revenue for the seller is on average higher for the Spanish auction than for the 
discriminatory auction. As we have argued above, bidders bid more aggressively for the first 
unít 00 the Spanish auetion, and expected revenues are higher as a result even if bidders onIy 
pay the weighted average ofwinning bids for the first unít. 
Should the Spanish Treasury maintain the auction format they use? The answer is not clear 
Even if revenue is on average higher for the Spanish auction, strategic eonsiderations are 
more complicated, and this could imply tbat less participation occurs, special1y since foreign 
bidders usually bid mainly in diseriminatory auctions. This could lower participation and, as a 
consequenee, decrease expected seller's revenue. Given that the discriminatory and the 
Spanish formats are similar when uncertainty decreases, a change to a discriminatory format 
at the same time as a commitment to better publíc information about the value of the good, 
could iocrease the Spanish Treasury's revenue. 
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Appendix: Computational notes for the model 
In this Appendix, we frrst present an overview of the algorithm we have used in the simulationslO• 
Second, we concentrate on sorne mathematical results which simplify the calculations for the Spanish 
auction. We treat the discriminatory case as in Gordy (96), and adapt the uniform and the Spanish 
auctions from it; so we present results without proofs. 
A.l General framework 
The key question to solve witb tbe simulation is how to explore tbe set of all possible strategies, 
denoted by n, to find an equilibrium. Gordy suggests a tatonernment algorithm: (1) take arbitrarily an 
eIement in n, say S; (2) assume that NM l bidders play S and find the best reply of fue NMth bidder to S, 
say~; (3) if s4 then S is an equilibrium, go to (1), eIse set S:=~ and go to (2). As Gordy points out, 
this algorithm might enter in a loop ofthe forro: S~ S' -+ ... ~S. Furthennore, the fact that ~ is the 
best reply to S does not imply that S' is more likely to be an equilibrium than any other strategy. 
We take a different approach. We list, in an arbitrary order, all the elements (strategies) in n, say 
n::::{SO,SbS;z, .•. ,Sp}. Notice that, given the characteristics of the model, n is a finite set. We check 
whether each element is an equilibrium or not following the previous arder. Hence \Ve check first So, 
second SI, and so forth up to Sp. In particular, after checking, say So, we check S] independently of 
whether So is an equilibrium or not. In other words, the order in which we check the elements is fixed 
arbitrarily and independentIy of what the equilibria are. 
Ifwe list, without repetition, all tIte elements in n, all its elements are checked. Hence all equilibria (if 
any) are found, and each eIement is checked only once. The maill problem with this approach is the 
computation time it requiresll . We reduce it in two ways. First, when checking a strategy, we do not 
look for the best reply. Notice tbat, given a strategy S in which (s](x),s2(x» are the bids when the 
signal is x, finding better bids than (SI(X),32(X» is, in general, computationally faster than finding the 
bes/ bids for signal x. Second, Gordy (96) only finds equilibria in which the high bid, s](x), is nonM 
decreasing in x (recal! that E(vlx) increases with x), and we only check for strategies with that 
property. 
How to list all the elements in n which are nonMdecreasing in the high bid? We have prograrnmed a 
function, </l, presented below, which maps n into itself. Denote as So the strategy: s](x)= sz(x):=O for al] 
x, then ljI satisfies that aU the elements in n satisfying the previous property can be listed, without 
repetition, as {So, IjI(So), IjIz(So), ... , cV'(So)}, where 41 denotes the composition of ljI with itself j times, 
Le.: IjIZ(So)=q.(IjI(So». The last element, f(So), is the símtegy: s](x)""s2(x)=1 for all x. So, to generate 
these elements we use the algorithm: (i) set S=So; (ii) if S=cV'(So), then stop; (ili) set S=IjI(S) and go to 
step (ii). 
To present the function 1jI, let us rewrite a strategy S as {S]h}, where s¡""(s](O), ... ,s¡(K)l and 
S2=(S2(O), ... ,82(K)l, such that s](x) and sz(x) are, as before, the high and the low bid, respectively, 
when the observed signal is x. Let {s¡,sz} be given, and se!: 
!fI({SI,S2})={~](S]),(0, ... ,Ol} if SI =S2 
{S¡,4'Z(S2)} othenvise 
10 The final version was written in Turbo Pascal. The exe file will be provided by the aufuors upon request. 
11 The computation time depends on: i) the number of elements in.Q to be checked, which is detennined by 'A. 
andK, ü) the average time required to check if an element is an equilibrium, which is delermined by Á. K and 
N. Combinations wiili í..21O, ~5 and N;z5 simu11aneously are urueasible. 
]3 
where fue functions 4JI and +2 are defined below. In words, when generating <!J({S¡h}), if S}=S2, we 
update SI using $1 and we set the new vector of low bids to (O, ... ,ot lf S¡*S2 we update S2 using (h· 
Denote fue x-th component of $\(s\) as (P1(s¡)(x), and{ anal~goUSly :or ):(:v~ w::et: x < x" 
<h(S\)(X)={S\(X)+J..-¡ if X::';X· $2(S2){X)= Sz (X) +A-1 if x=xu 
, (x) othenvise 1 S2 (x) otherwise 
where x"=min{x: s¡(x)<l} and x"=min{x : S2(X)~I(X)}. 
A.2 An aIgorithm to evaluate bidder's utility in the Spanish auctioo 
As we bave mentioned aboye, this part follows trivially from Gordy(96), so we present tbe results 
without proofs. 
Given a signa!, r, for the N-th bidder, the utility of a bid depends on rivals' signals. Furthennore, 
smce bidders are anonyrnous, the relevant faet is the vector of rivals' signals but not who receives 
each signal. For example, if N=4, the vectors ofrivals' signals (y¡,JI2J!3)={5,1,0) and Ú'1J!2J'3)= (1,5,0) 
are observationally equivalent for the other bidder. So, when computing the expected utility of a bid, it 
suffices to distinguish between vectors of rivals' signals that are different afier ordering the 
components within each vector in decreasing order (y¡2::Y22::)'J). The probability function for vector y of 
rivals' signals (afier ordering decreasingly), conditional on N~th bidder's signal x, g,(ylx), is: 
( I ) M NU-{K)B(X+UIl,K -x+a:(1-)l» g, y x = (y) -
;'"¡ y¡ B(a).l-,a(l-Il» 
whereMO and BO are the rnultinomial and the beta function respectively, see DeGroot (70). 
Assume that all bidders except tbe Hh play S, that ls, :E.,={S, ... ,s}. For bidder 1, the expected utility of 
the pair S=(S¡h), in the Spanish case, given a signal x, is given by equation (1). We decouple the right 
hand tenn in (1) as: 
E(V~ (s» = V 2 (s, S, x) + V ¡ (s, S, x) + V1' (s, S, x) + Vo (s,S, x) (Al) 
where, for mstance, Uo(s/S,x) is the expected utility of winning exactly zero units by the probability of 
that event, that is: 
Vo(s,S,x)=" I¿V(O) hO<S¡,S2'{S, .. ,S},v)dF(v/r) 
The other terms in the right sirle of (Al) are analogous for the events 1,1' and 2, defined in the mode!. 
Proceeding as Gordy (96), we have: 
V o (s, S, x) = -L Po (s, S, y)g, (yl x) , 
where the summation;s over all possible decreasingIy ordered vectors of N-I rivals' signals, and 
Po(s,S,y) is the probability of winning exactly zero units given s, rivals' signals y and tbat rivals play L. 
,={S, ... ,3}. Analogously: 
V¡ (s, S, r) := -exp(p(l-s¡»L p¡ (s,S,y)¡F¡ (NK -:E(y,x)+a(l-fl),NK +a,p)gy (yl x) 
, 
where ¡F¡O is tite confiuent hypergeometric function, see Abramowitz and Stegun (72), and L(y,x) is 
the summation ofthe components afthe vector y and the signalx. Also: 
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VI' (s,S, x) :=O-_L exp(p(l-O.5(s¡ +s»¿P¡o(s,S,y)¡F¡ (NK -:E(y, x) + 0'.(1- ).I-),NK +a.,p)g (y I r) ~€A y Y 
V 2 (s, S, x) = -exp(p(2- L5s¡ -0.5s2»Ep2(s,S,y)¡Fí (NK -:E(y,x)+a(l-¡.L),NK +0'.,2p)gy (y I x) , 
Notice tltat the tenns p(.) are easily computable. More importantly, the terms lF1(.) and &.(.) do not 
depend on tite strategy, that is, they can be computed at the start of the program and then used 
repeatedly when checking every strategy. 
Gordy (96) derives expressions for (2), the discriminatory auction. Expressions for (3), the unifonn 
case, are straightforward from it. 
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Square: Spanisb Cin:le: Discriminatory 
Missing valnes denote non.existence oí equilibrinm. WIlen multiple equilibria, we represent avcfllge valnc. 
Horizontal axis represents a, from 2 lo 20, wilh increments of2. 
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